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Abstract
With heterogeneity in both skills and preferences for the future, the Atkinson-
Stiglitz result that savings should not be taxed with optimal taxation of earnings does
not hold. Empirical evidence shows that on average people with higher skills save at
higher rates. Saez (2002) suggests that with such positive correlation taxing savings
can increase welfare. This paper analyzes this issue in a model with less than perfect
correlation between ability and preference for the future. To have multiple types at
the same earnings level, the number of types of jobs in the economy is restricted. Key
to the analysis is that types who value future consumption less are more tempted to
switch to a lower earning job. We show that introducing both a small savings tax on the
high earners and a small savings subsidy on the low earners increase welfare, regardless
of the correlation between ability and preferences for the future. However, a uniform
savings tax, as in the Nordic dual income tax, increases welfare only if that correlation
is sufficiently high. There are also some results on optimal taxes that parallel the
results on introducing small taxes.
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1 Introduction
The Atkinson-Stiglitz (1976) theorem shows that when the available tax tools include non-
linear earnings taxes, optimal taxation is inconsistent with taxing savings when two key
assumptions are satisfied: (1) that all consumers have preferences that are separable be-
tween consumption and labor and (2) that all consumers have the same sub-utility function
of consumption. Empirical evidence suggests that on average those with higher skills save
at higher rates (Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes, 2004, Banks and Diamond, 2008). We therefore
relax the second condition and analyze the taxation of savings with heterogeneity in both
skill and savings propensity. We consider both uniform and earnings-varying taxation of
savings.
This paper uses a simple model in which the number of types of jobs in the economy is
restricted. This sheds light on the desirability of earnings-dependent savings taxes and the
role of the positive correlation between skill and savings propensity. The paper provides an
argument for making the taxation of savings progressive in earnings. In a two-skills model,
we find that the savings of the high earners should be taxed, whereas the savings of the low
earners should be subsidized. This result is independent of the correlation between ability
and discount factors, provided that the optimum has the high skilled workers on the more
productive job. A uniform savings tax, however, only increases welfare if that correlation is
sufficiently high.
Our paper builds on the analysis in Saez (2002). He derives conditions on endogenous
variables to sign the effect on social welfare of introducing a uniform commodity tax or a
subsidy, when consumers have heterogeneous sub-utility functions of consumption. With
an optimal non-linear earnings tax, a small tax on savings increases welfare if either the
net marginal social value is negatively correlated with savings, conditional on earnings, or
on average those who choose to earn less save less than those who choose to earn more,
if restricted to the same earnings. By restricting the number of types of jobs, we analyze
the importance of the (exogenous) correlation between skills and savings preferences for the
taxation of savings.
Primary attention is focused on a model with four worker types - with two discount factors
and two skill levels. Thus we are examining a particular example of a multidimensional
screening problem. The model assumes the existence of two jobs, rather than the standard
model where each worker can select the number of hours to be worked. 1 This results in a
setting where workers with the same skill but different discount factors choose the same job
and so have the same earnings. With the introduction of earnings-related savings tax rates,
: A limited number of jobs was assumed in Diamond (2006).

they are subject to the same tax rates. We assume that at the optimum both high-skill
types work at the high-skill job and that redistribution from high earners to low earners
is the important redistribution. Given these assumptions social welfare increases with the
introduction of a tax on the savings of high earners and with the introduction of a subsidy
on the savings of low earners. The relative frequencies of the four types in the population
plays no role in the derivation of this result, conditional on the assumed structure of the
optimum.
The underlying assumption is that those valuing the future more are more willing to
work than those valuing the future less, conditional on the disutility of work. This means
that an incentive compatibility (IC) constraint just binding on a high skill worker with low
value for the future is not binding on a high skill worker with high value for the future.
Earnings-dependent taxes and subsidies on savings allow an increase in redistribution by
targeting types in a given job with saving preferences different than those of types who are
just tempted to switch jobs. In particular, introducing taxation of savings of high earners
(and transferring the revenue back equally to all high earners) eases the binding IC constraint
since it transfers resources from the high saver to the low saver for whom the IC constraint is
binding. Introducing a subsidy on savings for low earners (financed by equal taxation on all
low earners) also eases the binding IC constraint by making switching to the lower job less
attractive to the high earner with low savings. In extensions, the case for taxing the savings
of high earners appears to be more robust than the case for subsidizing the savings of low
earners. While the focus of the paper is the introduction of small taxes, we also consider
optimal taxes under stronger assumptions. 2
The assumption that those with less discounting of the future are more willing to work
is in line with standard modeling, representing preferences by u (x) + S,u (c) — v (z/rii). An
alternative specification j-u (x) + u (c) — v (~/n
; ) would imply the exact opposite. That is,
types with higher 5 l prefer to save more, but to work less. We examine some empirical
support for our assumption, using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). We
find that conditional on education and age, people with higher discount factors tend to earn
more. To proxy for the discount factor, we use reported savings and the time horizon people
report having in mind when making spending and savings decision. We also use these proxies
to revisit the positive correlation between skills and savings propensities.
This paper contributes to the literature on the optimal choice of the tax base and the
joint taxation of labor and capital incomes in particular. Banks and Diamond (2008) review
the literature on the inclusion of capital income in the tax base. Gordon (2004) and Gordon
The analysis assumes rational savings by all workers. Concern about too little individual savings is also
relevant for retirement savings policies.

and Kopczuk (2008) argue that capital income reveals information about earnings ability and
thus should be included in the tax base. Blomquist and Christiansen (2008) analyze how
people with different skills and different preferences for leisure who cannot be separated with
an income tax, may be separated with a commodity tax. The four-types model with hours
chosen by workers has been studied by Tenhunen and Tuomala (2008), which calculates a set
of examples, but explores the analytics only in two- and three-type models. They consider
both welfarist and paternalist objective functions. We relate the results in their calculated
examples to some of our results below. We focus on the four-types model since the result
in a two-types model, while striking, does not seem relevant for policy inferences. 3 While
the focus of this paper is on capital taxation, the intuition generalizes to the taxation of
other commodities for which the preferences are heterogeneous, since this heterogeneity may
impact the labor choice as well (Kaplow, 2008a).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model with four types and
two jobs. Section 3 characterizes respectively the first best and the restricted first best,
referring to no taxation of savings and an 'equal job, equal pay' restriction. Section 4
introduces incentive compatibility constraints and characterizes the second best including
the introduction of earnings-varying savings tax rates. Optimal savings tax rates are also
considered. Section 5 considers a uniform savings tax, rather than one varying with the
level of earnings. For comparison, Section 6 reviews a two-types model. Section 7 discusses
empirical support for the assumptions and Section 8 has concluding remarks.
2 Model
We consider a model with two periods. Agents consume in both periods, but work only in
the first period. Preferences are assumed to be separable over time and between consumption
and work. Denoting first period consumption by x, second period consumption by c, and
earnings by z, preferences satisfy
U(x, c, z) = u (x) + 5u (c) — v (z/n)
,
with u' > 0,u" < and v' > 0,v" > 0. An agent's ability n determines the disutility of
producing output z. An agent's preference for future consumption depends on the discount
factor 5.
We consider heterogeneity in both ability n and preference for future consumption 5.
''Kocherlakota (2005) provides an argument for regressive earnings-varying wealth taxation. He analyzes
a model with asymmetric information about stochastically evolving skills, which is not present in this model.

Although robust insights for optimal taxation have been derived in models with two types,
considering heterogeneity in two parameters in a model with two types implies perfect cor-
relation between the two parameters. The inference based on a simple two-types economy,
although simple, may therefore be misleading. In order to allow for imperfect correlation,
we consider a four-types model. We denote the four types by ll,lh,hl,hh with frequencies
fij and welfare-weights rj^. The first two types have low ability ni, but differ in discount
factors 6 1 and Sh, with Sh > Si. The second two types have high ability nh , with n/, > n-i,
and also differ in discount factors Si and Sh.
high discount low discount
factor Sh factor Si
high ability rih
low ability ni
hh hi
lh 11
There are only two jobs in the economy, h and /. The output from a job is independent
of the worker's type, while the disutility of holding a job varies with ability. The low-ability
types can only hold the low job. The high-ability types can hold either job. We assume that
redistribution to the low-skilled types is sufficiently important and the type mix sufficiently
balanced that all high-skilled workers hold high-skilled jobs at the various optima analyzed.
This requires a restriction on the weights in the social welfare functions and the population
distribution, which we do not explore.
We begin with the first best, which differs from the usual treatment in that the output
produced on a job is the same for everyone holding the job. We assume a linear technology.
The first best has the property that there is no marginal taxation of savings. Then we
consider a restricted first best (the term 'first best' refers to a lack of incentive compatibility
constraints, the term 'restricted' means limited tax tools, but not limited by IC constraints)
with zero taxation of savings and the requirement that everyone holding a job receives the
same pay (no taxes based on identity, only on potential earnings). We calculate whether
social welfare can be improved by taxing or subsidizing savings.
We then turn to the second best, with taxes based on earnings, not potential earnings,
so that there is an incentive compatibility constraint. We assume a zero taxation of savings
restriction, thus preserving the condition of equal pay for equal work. Again we ask about
potential gains from taxing or subsidizing savings.

3 First Best
In the first best, each worker is assigned to the matching job and the social welfare function
is maximized with respect to the type-specific consumption levels in the first and second
periods and the job-specific output levels, subject to a resource constraint. With the welfare
weight of type ij of i]
t
,
the first best solves:
MaximizeI|C,, £ /y^j (u [xtj] + 6jU [cy] - v {z l /n,})
(1)
subject to: E + ^2 fij ix ij + #_1 cy ~~ z%) <
Forming a Lagrangian with A the Lagrange multiplier for the resource constraint, we have
£ = Yl f*rt*i (u^ + Siu fad ~ v \ Zl ln^ ~ A 5Z fa (Xii + R
'lcH ~ zi)
hi i,j
We define the net marginal social value of first period consumption for an individual of
type ij as
9ij = VtjU [xij] - A.
Along the relevant portion of the social welfare optima, we have the following properties:
gij = and u [x^] = 5jRu' [cy] for all i,j, and
v' [zi/nA
ifulu + fihVih)
—
L
= (/« + fih) A = fuVuu' [xu] + fihVih.u' [xih] ,
rii
for both the high-skilled and the low-skilled jobs. The net marginal social value of first period
consumption for each type equals and the saving of each type is undistorted. Given that
the required output for a given job is independent of an individual's type, the earnings are
marginally distorted upward for one discount- factor type and downward for the other type,
since v! [xu] ^ u' [x^], unless the welfare weights satisfy T]d = >] lh . The output is undistorted
'on average' though.
3.1 Restricted First Best: Equal Pay for Equal Work and No
Taxation of Savings
If the (after-tax) earnings on a job, y ; , is restricted to be type-independent and savings can
not be taxed, there are further constraints, which we approach using the indirect utility-of-

consumption function, iuj [y, R\. This function satisfies
u>j [j/j R] = max u [x] + 5jU [c]
subject to: x + R~ 1 c — y.
For later use, we note that
dwj
u \x]
dy
j£ = R- 2 cu'[x} = R- 1 (y-x)u'[x} = R-hJ iy,R}u'[x}
where Sj [y, R] is the savings function of someone with discount factor 5j.
We continue to assume that the welfare weights and population fractions are such that
all high skilled are on the more productive job at the optimum. The restricted first best
solves the following problem,
Maximize^ ]T fljrjij (Wj [yn R] - v [zjn,])
subject to: E + J2 fij (Vi ~ zi) <
Forming a Lagrangian, we have
(2)
hi hi
The first order conditions (FOC) are
5Z fctfijU' [Xij] = A^/y
3 3
Yl fitful \zilni\ lni = A 5Z^'
3 3
for i — h, I. Recalling the definition of the net marginal social utility, g tJ = rj^u' [xij] — A,
the population-weighted values add to zero at each job,
}] fij9ij = for i = h,l.
3
Thus, the welfare weights determine the direction of desired redistribution (given the equal

pay condition) between workers on each job. Also, in the absence of savings taxation,
vl [xij] = 5jRu' [cij] for all i,j.
The FOC for job outputs, z,, are the same as given above.
3.2 Restricted First Best with Small Earnings-Dependent Savings
Taxes
Given the observability of earnings, small linear taxes on savings (collected in the first period)
could be set differently for high and low earners. This can for instance be implemented by
the rules on retirement savings accounts, like the IRA and 401 (k) in the US. The (local)
desire to redistribute can be met by a small linear tax or subsidy on savings by workers on
a given job with the revenues returned equally to them by raising net-of-tax earnings on the
job.
Differentiating the Lagrangian with respect to a savings tax rate r, on those with earnings
level i/i, evaluated at a zero tax level:
d7~
= A
( H fa (tt ~ xv) ) - H fvW' \xij\ (Vi ~ x u) •
The impact of a savings tax on the Lagrangian is made up of two pieces: the impact on the
revenue constraint and the impact on utilities. Using the FOC with respect to j/j, multiplied
by ?/i, the derivative can be written as:
-fr
= 11 fa (%'"' (^ ~ A ) X 'J = 11 fa9UxH-
3 3
Recall that
Hfij9ij = for i = hJ-
3
This implies that a tax on the savings by the two types on a given job increases welfare if
the savings of the one type towards which redistribution is desirable saves sufficiently little
compared to the other type.
The welfare weights imply the desired direction of redistribution within productivity

types and so the signs of g}J . With equal incomes and different discount factors, we have
Cih > Cu
Thus, if first period utilities get the same weights for both types, n
il
= r)lh , gu < < g,h,
implying a desire to redistribute to the high saver. In contrast, if second period utilities get
the same weights for both types, i]u Si = nlh5h, the signs are reversed, implying a desire to
redistribute to the low saver. If there is no desire to redistribute for high (low) skill types
we have rjhh u' [xhh] = Vmu' \xm} {Vihu ' lx ih} — Vau> \xu})- m general, with uniform weights for
given discount factors, i] ht = r)u , we do not satisfy both conditions.
4 Second Best
We draw a distinction between restricted first-best analyses and second-best ones based on
the absence or presence of IC constraints involving taking a job with lower productivity
(the reverse having been ruled out by assumption). That is, the distinction depends on the
observability of productivity. The prime issue in second-best analyses is determining which
IC constraints are binding. We start with the further restriction, as above, that savings not
be taxed. With no taxation of savings and equal pay for equal work, the IC constraint of not
imitating the other discount rate type who is holding the same job does not bind. Similarly,
if a high productivity worker were to take the low productivity job, the person imitated
would be the one with the same discount factor. Imitation is a misnomer here since there
need not be such a worker for a high skill worker to optimize savings while taking a low skill
job given the assumed policy tools and information.
We add the critical assumption that earnings distribution issues are sufficiently important
that at the second-best optimum (with IC constraints) the net marginal social value of first
period consumption gtJ = r/^u' [x lj] — A is negative for both of the worker types holding
the high-skill job and positive for both of the types holding the low-skilled job. Without a
binding IC constraint, this condition could not hold at the optimum as noted above.
Assumption 1 The net marginal social values of first period consumption satisfy
9hj < ®,9ij > 0, for j -h,l.

4.1 Second best with No Taxation of Savings
We assume that the Pareto-weights and population fractions are such that all high-skilled
workers work at the high-skilled job and the desired level of redistribution to lower earners
is sufficient that at least one IC constraint is binding.
Maximize,,,, J2 f^q^ (vjj [yi} R] - v [zjn,])
subject to: E + J2 fij {Vi ~ ~0 < ° ( 3 )
Wh [yh,R] - v [zh /nh ] > wh [yh R] - v [zi/nh]
wi [yh, R] ~ v [zh/nh \ > W[ [yu R] - v [zi/nh ] .
Forming a Lagrangian with
fj,j the Lagrange multiplier for the corresponding IC constraint,
and assuming that at the optimum each worker is assigned to the matching job, we have
C = Y fan (WJ ty" R ] ~ v lZi/n^ - AY fa (y > ~ *)
i,j hi
+ 22 ^j (wj [y/" R] ~ v [ z>Jnh\ _ wi \y<-> R ] + v [zi/nh])
3
Since the first-period consumption of type hj if switching to the low job equals the first-
period consumption of type Ij, the FOC with respect to earnings are
Y fWhju' [xhj] +YW [xhj] ~ XY Ai = °'
; j j
Y hsiij 11 ' [xij] -Y vju> [xu\ - x Yf<j = °-
3
Given the definition of the net social utility g,j = i)y ii' [x,j] — A, this implies
Y^9ho = -Y ^ u>^ < °>
3 3
Y fato = Y ^'"'M > °-
3 3
The population-weighted values add to a positive expression
Y f'J 9 'J = Y Pi ("' lXli\ ~ u ' \-Xh& > °'
i,j 3
LO

That is, transfers which would be worth doing without an IC constraint are restricted, raising
the social marginal utilities of consumption, on average, above the value of resources in the
hands of the government. Since the IC constraints are on the high skilled types, on average
more redistribution from the high earners to the low earners is desirable.
IC constraints Given the equal pay constraint, it follows that only one of the IC con-
straints is binding, and it is the one on the low discount factor type. To see this consider
the difference in consumption utility from different incomes,
A [yh,Vu £j. R] = wj [Vh, R] - w3 [yi, R]
This difference in consumption utility is increasing in the discount factor,
dA[yh,yi,Sj,R]
35
u [ckj ] - u [cij] > 0.
The difference in labor disutility does not depend on the discount factor. Thus if the IC
constraint is binding on the low discount factor type, it is not binding on the high discount
factor type. The low discount factor type values earnings in the first period less and is
therefore more tempted to switch to the less productive job.
4.2 Second Best with Small Earnings-Dependent Taxes on Savings
As above, the sign of the welfare impact of introducing a small linear savings tax or subsidy
depends on the welfare weights. Given observability of earnings, the small linear tax on
savings could be different for high and low earners. The welfare impacts of introducing a
tax on savings (collected in the first period) are obtained by differentiating the Lagrangian
(with savings taxation included and the tax rates n set at zero):
O^r = A f ]P fhj (yh - xhj )
J
- Y^ fhjVhj u> ixhj] (Vh - x hj) -W1 [xhi] (yh - xu ) ,
^7 = A ( 5Z /« ( y ' " x«) ) " Yl fljlllJ u 'M fa ~ x 'j) + Vi u ' [-r"l (w - -r») •
That is, the impact on the Lagrangian is made up of three pieces: the impact on the revenue
constraint, the impact on utilities, and the impact on the binding IC constraint.
11

The FOC for earnings are
53 fhJ9hj + V-iu' [xhi\ = 0,
3
j
Multiplying these by the earnings level at the job, j/*, and substituting, we have
dC
= 53 fhjQhjXhj + l-hu ' [xhl] x hl,
J
E- = 53 fa9UxU ~^ tx"] x"'
<9r
;
Substituting for n t u' [xu] from the FOC for earnings, we find
t^— = fhh9hh (xhh - Xhi) >
and
K- = JihQih [xih - xu ) < 0.
OTi
The signs follow from the assumption on the net social marginal utilities and the differences
in savings behavior by types ih and il for i — h, I. The correlation between skill and discount
plays no role in signing these expressions. The Proposition immediately follows.
Proposition 1 At the second best optimum, assuming that all high skill workers hold high
skill jobs and g^j < 0,gij > 0, for j = h,l, then introduction of a small linear tax on savings
that falls on high earners is welfare improving; and introduction of a small linear subsidy on
savings that falls on low earners is welfare improving.
One can increase the redistribution from high earners/high savers by taxing savings, but
increasing net-of-tax earnings just enough that the high earners/low savers remain indifferent
to job change and thus the binding IC constraint is unchanged. One can also increase
the redistribution towards the low earners/high savers by subsidizing their savings, but
decreasing net-of-tax earnings such that the low earners/low savers remain indifferent so
that it does not become more attractive for the high earners/low savers to take the low job.
12

4.3 Second Best with Optimal Linear Earnings-Dependent Taxes
on Savings
We have considered the introduction of small savings taxes on high and low earners. Part of
the interest in this analysis comes from the possible link to the signs of the optimal taxes.
Derivation of the FOC for the optimal linear savings taxes is straightforward; we show that
it matches the signs of the small improvements given the additional condition that workers
save more if the after-tax return to savings are higher. 4
One difference in analysis is that changes in both the earnings and savings taxes have a
first order effect on tax revenues through the behavioral change in savings. In first period
units, the tax revenue from a linear savings tax n levied on the savings of workers with
discount factor 5j and earnings yl equals T x sd [yi,R(l — r,)]. For notational convenience,
denote optimal savings Sj [y,, R(l — r,)] by s^. (Given preference separability, there is no
dependence on the effort to achieve gross earnings.) A second difference is that the relative
size of the utility loss of a marginal increase in the savings tax compared to the utility gain
of a marginal increase in earnings depends on the level of the savings tax. That is,
dr {
svu l^\°K i_ Ti
M F«J i-ndVi'
Forming a Lagrangian, and assuming that at the optimum each worker is assigned to the
matching job, we now have
C = Y htfij H [W. (! ~ T i) R\ - v \zilni]) - xY Ai ttyi ~ z^ ~ TiSv [W> i l - T i) R}}
+ fi
t
(wi [yh , (1 - rh ) R]-v [zh /nh ] - w t [yu (1 - r ( ) R) + v [zi/nh ]) .
The FOC for earnings are
Y fhjVhju' \xhj] + fru' [xhi] - Y X^ ( 2 " Th ~FTl ) = °'dy
Y htfljU*' [Xij] - fliU [Xu] - Yl Mlj ( 1 - Ti-dy
'Consideration of earnings-dependent nonlinear savings taxation would raise the issue of the degree of
complexity that is interesting for policy purposes.
L3

The FOC for savings tax rates are
Y IhjVhjU [Xhj] ftJ + ftu' [xta] -r^ Y XfhJ { s^ + Th^1L i h •!• 'h I OTh
J 3
= o,
SU + r^} 0.
Denote by /?/, = R(l - r^) and Ri = R(l — n) the after-tax returns to savings for
respectively the high and low skill types. Combining the first order conditions as before, we
find that the optimal linear savings tax is such that
fhhQhh {Xhh ~ xm) = rhY Xfhj \ shj - -Q^Shi + ^y!r Rh \ (4 )
and
fihQlh (xih ~ Xll) = TiY X f'J I SlJ ~
~d^
S
"
+
TR
Rl
|
' ^
The left-hand sides in equations (4) and (5) correspond to the welfare changes of introducing
earnings-dependent taxes on the high earners and low earners respectively. Thus, if the sum
of the terms in brackets on the right-hand side is positive, the optimal linear tax is positive
if the introduction of a small tax is welfare-improving and vice versa. Since preferences are
additive, -^- < 1, and so s tj — -p^-Su > for i = h,l. Hence, a sufficient condition for
the right-hand side term to be positive is that savings are increasing in the after-tax return,
^ii > n
dRi — u -
Proposition 2 At the second best optimum, assuming that savings are increasing in the
after-tax returns, all high skill workers hold high skill jobs, and ghj < 0,gij > for j — h,l,
the optimal linear savings tax is positive for the high earners and negative for the low earners.
4.4 Mechanism Design Optimum in Tenhunen and Tuomala (2008)
As noted above, Tenhunen and Tuomala (2008) consider two-, three- and four-types models
with hours chosen by workers. They derive the mechanism design optimal allocations as-
suming CES preferences with varying correlations between discount and skill, with implicit
marginal taxes shown in their Figure 1. For all but very high correlation, they find that sav-
ings are implicitly marginally taxed for the high skill worker with low discount factor (type
3), savings are implicitly subsidized for the low skill worker with high discount factor (type
2), and there are no other marginal savings distortions. With very high correlation, the low
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FIGURE 1 Marginal tnx on savings m the welfarisf cnse
skill worker with low discount factor (type 1) is implicitly taxed, which also happens in the
two type model, which has perfect correlation. The potential relevance of the pattern we find
is enhanced by their findings. In contrast with our model, the mechanism design optimal
allocation allows distortion of the savings of each type separately. As long as the correlation
is not too high, on average the savings tax is positive for the high skill and negative for the
low skill types.
4.5 Robustness
We consider three extensions to highlight the extent of robustness of the main propositions.
First, we allow different ability levels for the two high earner types. Second, we allow different
discount factors for all four types. Third, we show how the analysis extends to three skill
levels in workers and jobs, preserving the various assumptions.
Different Ability Levels of the High Earners In the four-types model above, we
assume that the two types with high skill have exactly the same skill. As long as the
high skill type with high discount factor has higher skill than the high skill type with low
discount factor, Proposition 1 continues to hold. However, if the type with low discount
factor is sufficiently more skilled, the type with high discount factor may be more tempted
to switch to the low earner job for which less output is required. For given skill of type hh,
nhh , this reversal of which IC constraint is binding holds when the ability level nM of type hi
is higher than hM (> nhh ), where the cut-off level nM is such that the IC constraint is just
\r>

binding on both types,
{wi [yh , R] - v {zh/hM)} ~ W'i [Vi, R]-v {zi/hhi)} =
{wh [yh, R]-v (zh/nhh)} - {wh [yt , R]-v (zi/nhh)} .
With v [z/n] convex, the difference in labor disutilities between jobs, {v (zi/n) — v (zh/n)},
is decreasing in n. Hence, for values of n^ higher than n« the IC constraint is more stringent
for the high discount saver. In this case, a savings subsidy on the high earners and a savings
tax on the low earners are welfare improving. This is the opposite of Proposition 1.
Different Discount Factors among the High and Low Savers With job-specific
earnings and no taxation of savings, a high skill worker considering switching to the low job
chooses optimal savings without needing to match any particular worker holding the low
job. Thus, with the same skill among high earners, the gain from switching to the low job
is always higher for the high skill worker who has lower preference for savings, regardless of
the discount rates among the low skill workers. We continue to have a welfare gain from
introducing taxation of savings among high earners as in Proposition 1.
Subsidization of savings of low earners will continue to generate a welfare gain as long
as the discount factor of the high-skill low-saver is small enough relative to the distribution
of discount factors among holders of the low skill job. Denoting by x^i the first-period
consumption of the high-skilled low saver if taking the low skill job, the FOC for earnings
on that job is:
3
The impact of a savings tax on low earners is
7^7 = Yl f'j9ijXij ~ hu' [x'hi] xM .
3
Comparing the consumption in the IC constraint with a weighted average of consumptions
among low earners, this derivative is negative (and the gain from the subsidization of the
savings of low earners in Proposition 1 continues to hold) if and only if xM > xi, where
_
__
Ej fij9ijXij
Ylj fijSij
With the net marginal social values assumption, gy > 0, for j — h, /, x~i is a proper weighted
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average of the Xy. Since the discount rates for the marginal high skill type may well be too
high to meet this condition, we consider the tax of the savings of higher earners to be a more
robust policy conclusion than the subsidization of the savings of low earners.
We are exploring two extensions to the basic model, one with an education choice and
one with a continuum of worker types. In both cases, preliminary work suggests the same
pattern of greater robustness of the taxation of higher earners than of the subsidization of
lower earners. 5
Three Ability Levels, Three Jobs We introduce an intermediate skill level in the model.
We extend the assumption that welfare weights and population fractions are such that at the
optimum all the high skilled are on the most productive job to also have all the intermediate
skilled on the intermediate job. We again consider the case in which agents may be tempted
to switch to jobs designed for less skilled people. Only two downward constraints are relevant
though.
First, as above, for two agents with the same skill, but different discount factors, the IC
constraint is slack for the type with the higher discount factor if it is binding for the type
with the lower discount factor. The reason is that, with
A [2/1,2/2, 5j, R] = Wj [yi,R] - w3 [y2 , R] ,
dA[ym ,yi,6j,R] d^{yh ,y l ,8J ,R] .both =———-
—
- > and ———-
—
- > for i — m, I.
do ad
Second, with v [z/n] convex, we have a similar condition for the difference in the'disutility
of labor between jobs. That is, with
A' [zh , zi,n] = v [zh /n] - v [z,/n\ ,
dA'[zh ,zi,n]
, , 2
= {-v [zh /n\ zh + v [z[/n\ z L ) jn < 0.
Thus, for two agents with the same discount factor, the IC constraint of switching to the
low-skilled job is slack for the type with the highest ability if it is satisfied for the type with
the intermediate ability switching to the low-skilled job and for the type with highest ability
switching to the intermediate job. That is, the local IC constraints imply the global IC
constraint.
In a similar way as for the four-types model, we can set up the Lagrangian for the
'With heterogeneity in discount factors, people who discount the future less may choose to invest more
in education. If only education determines a worker's skill level, high-skilled workers have higher discount
factors than low-skilled workers.
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constrained maximization problem. The two relevant IC constraints are
Wi [yh , R]-v [zh /nh ] > wt [ym , R] - v [zm/nh ]
,
wi [ym , R] - v [zm/nm } > wt [yh R] - v [zi/nm]
.
The impact of the introduction of earnings-dependent savings taxes on the Lagrangian equals
respectively
a
— = fhh9hh {xhh - xM ) > 0,
OTh
DC
~7\ JmhQmh \%mh %ml) < ^i
DC
77- = fihQih (xih - xu ) < 0.
or1
This implies that Proposition 1 continues to hold for the high earners and the low earners.
The following Proposition applies for the intermediate earners.
Proposition 3 In a model with three ability levels and three jobs, the introduction of a small
linear tax (subsidy) on savings that falls on the intermediate earners is welfare improving
if redistribution from (to) the intermediate earners to (from) general revenues is welfare
improving.
Proposition 3 implies that there is a single sign change in the response of welfare to taxing
savings as a function of earnings. This result generalizes for more than three jobs as well, if
the welfare weights are non-increasing in skill. The savings of workers with earnings below
a given level are subsidized, the savings of workers with earning above that level are taxed.
The result depends on the assumption that types with the same skill are at the same job,
which becomes increasingly strained with many jobs.
The single sign change of the welfare impact of introducing a savings tax as a function of
earnings also holds for the optimal linear earnings-dependent savings taxes when workers have
CRRA preferences, u [x] = jz~i and 7 < 1- With logarithmic preferences, u [x] = log [x], the
optimal savings tax rate is strictly increasing in the earnings of workers if they are uniformly
distributed across jobs, f}] — f3 for Vz, j. Since for logarithmic preferences s,j = -j^yi and
-t^- = 0, the optimal tax on the savings of earners at job i satisfies
fih9ih (Xih ~ xu) = T,^ \fij-~Xu.
With fij — fj for \/i,j and first-period consumption x io — j^-yi, we find the following
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expression for the optimal savings tax,
fh {Si - Sh ) (r\ih A
7"i
EiVi&;\» l + 5
Since <$/, > 5i, with the welfare weights non-increasing in skill, this implies that the optimal
linear savings tax is increasing in earnings,
dTi
7T >0 -
oyi
5 Second Best with Uniform Taxes on Savings
Proposition 1 leaves the natural question of what to do with a Nordic dual income tax where
the tax rate on savings is required to be the same for both earnings levels. Adding the
responses to the two separate tax changes, we have
oc dc oc
,
. . .
"H
-
= a ^r- = JhhQhh {Xhh ~ Xhl) + Jlh9lh {%ih ~ Xii)Ot dr h Oti
In contrast with the earnings-varying tax on savings, the correlation between skill and dis-
count factor plays a role here.
If there is no desire to redistribute within a job, ##, = gu, for i = h,l, then
r Jhh ST~^ r Jhh I r -ihh9hh = y^ , y , Thj9hj — -v , fJ-iU [xM \
,
r Jlh Y~^ c f' h I r 1
Jih9ih = ^ , > Jij9ij = ^ , l-Hu F«J •
Thus, the welfare impact of a change in the uniform tax on savings equals
9£ ( fhh , r n / N flh n]/ A
»T \L,-/m Lj/y /
It is convenient to write this as
9£ flh ,
r„ ! , J' fhhTLjfh] \
_ . „__„ w {x„ _^^^n - i j
,
with
_
u'\x hl ] (x hl - xhh )
U' [xa ] {Xu - Xih)
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Since Xu > xih,
S ,gn (_j _ S ,9n {-jj^jrO ~ 1j
The sign of this expression depends on the distribution of types and the ratio of the weights,
Q. That is, Q > 1 is a sufficient condition for a positive correlation between aspects,
1h > y/"1, , to imply that introducing a savings tax increases social welfare.
12j fhj Hj flj
Assuming homothetic preferences, so that ^M = £M-, the expression for f2 becomes
u
\f {
Chl
. This expression is equal to one for the log utility function. For CRRA prefer-
ences, u [x] = y— , we find
Thus, if the relative risk aversion 7 is smaller than 1, then 0, > 1 and a positive correlation
between ability and discount factor (i.e. y/hft > y/"1, ) implies that |^ is positive. If 7
is larger than 1, the sign of |^ depends on the size of the correlation and the magnitude
of the earnings difference between jobs. Conversely, when the correlation is negative, |^ is
negative if 7 is greater than 1. This implies the following proposition.
Proposition 4 // there is no desire to redistribute within a job, g,f, — gu, for i — h,l,
with CRRA -preferences, a uniform small tax on savings increases welfare if the relative
risk aversion is smaller than one and the correlation between ability and discount factor is
positive. A uniform small subsidy on savings increases welfare if the relative risk aversion
is greater than one and the correlation between ability and discount factor is negative.
Corollary 1 If there is no desire to redistribute within a job, g^ — gu, for 1 = h,l, with
logarithmic preferences, a uniform small tax (subsidy) on savings increases welfare if and
only if the correlation between ability and discount factor is positive (negative).
As with the earnings-varying taxes, the sign result for introducing a uniform tax matches
that for optimal linear taxation in some interesting cases. Denote by RT = R(l—r) the after-
tax returns to savings and by Sij the savings of type ij as a function of after-tax earnings
and the after-tax interest rate. Setting the derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to r
equal to zero, we find the following condition for the optimal linear tax,
fhh9hh (xhh - xM ) + fihQih {xih ~ xu) = t } Xfi:j \ s^ - ~-Su + w^-Rt
U
\Jd ij (-/ O 1 -i
dyi dRT
''For CARA preferences, §y is negative when the correlation between ability and discount factor is
dc
drnegative. When the correlation is positive, ^ is positive if the absolute risk aversion is sufficiently sma
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If the sum of the terms in brackets is positive, we have that the optimal uniform tax is
positive if the introduction of a small uniform tax is welfare improving. This is the case for
logarithmic preferences and CRRA preferences with relative risk aversion 7 < 1.
Proposition 5 If there is no desire to redistribute within a job, g,h = g,i, for i = h,l, with
logarithmic preferences or CRRA preferences with 7 < 1, the optimal linear uniform tax on
savings is positive if the correlation between ability and discount factor is positive.
6 Two Types
Using a model with two types of workers, a high-skilled worker with high discount factor and
a low-skilled worker with low discount factor, the empirical finding of a positive correlation
between skill and savings rates is treated as a perfect correlation. In this model, if there is
positive (negative) marginal earnings taxation then there is a gain from introducing positive
(negative) marginal savings taxation. The corollary is that introducing savings taxation is
a gain if redistribution goes from the high earner to the low earner. The full mechanism
design optimum has the same property. The source of this inference does not seem robust
to realistic diversity in the economy. With two-dimensional heterogeneity, there are low
earners with both high and low savings rates. If a high earner can imitate the savings of a
low earner with the same savings propensities, a savings tax on the low earner does not work
to discourage the high earner from imitating. Thus to model less-than-perfect correlation,
we use the four-types model with high and low earners with both high and low concern for
the future. We report the results for two types here to mark the contrast with the four types
model. The proof parallels that of the same result for the mechanism design optimum, which
is in Diamond (2003). We consider the second-best Pareto frontier with the types referred
to as 1 and 2.
Proposition 6 In a two-types model without taxes on savings and with sign{5\ — 62) =
sign (nj — n 2 ), the introduction of a small linear tax (subsidy) on savings at a given earnings
level is welfare improving if and only if earnings at that level are marginally taxed (subsidized).
Corollary 2 In a two-types model without taxes on savings and with sign (5i — 62) = sign (nj — n2 ),
the introduction of a savings tax on the lower earner is welfare improving if redistribution
goes from the higher earner to the lower earner.
The proposition combines the properties of the mechanism design optima in the two
separate two-types models with heterogeneity in one dimension. When both types have the
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same discount factor, but different abilities, the earnings of the potentially imitated type
are marginally taxed or subsidized if the ability of that type is lower or higher respectively
(Mirrlees, 1971). Similarly, when both types have the same ability, but different discount
factors, the savings of the potentially imitated type are marginally taxed or subsidized if
the discount factor for that type is lower or higher respectively. If both types have the
same discount factor, distorting savings does not help separate the two types (Atkinson and
Stiglitz, 1976). Similarly, if both types have the same ability, earnings are not subject to
marginal taxation.' However, when the two types differ in both ability and discount factor,
both the marginal taxation (or subsidization) of earnings and the marginal taxation (or
subsidization) of savings is used to separate types.
7 Preferences and IC Constraints
Above we used the utility functions u [x] + 8jU [c] — v [z/rij]. This family of utility functions
has the property that those with higher savings rates (larger values of 5j) are more willing
to increase work for a given amount of additional pay. But that is not the only way in
which the savings and labor supply decisions can be connected. For example, with the
utility functions {u [x] + 5jU [c]) /5j — v [z/rij] = u [x] /8j + u [c] — v [z/rij], the relationship
is reversed - those with higher savings rates are less willing to increase work for additional
pay. If we had assumed this class of functions, then we would have reversed the pattern
of desirable savings taxes in Proposition 1 - having the IC constraint bind for the high
saver would imply that it is not binding for the low saver, implying, in turn, that there
should be a subsidy of savings for high earners and a tax on savings for low earners. More
generally, a one-dimensional family of separable utility functions, U [<p [x, c, j] ,z,j], can have
any pattern between the variation in the subutility function of consumption and the variation
in the interaction between consumption and labor. This raises the question of identifying an
empirical basis for distinguishing which case is more relevant. That it is standard practice
to write utility in the form employed does not, by itself, shed light on its empirical reality.
While the formal model has consumption and work simultaneous in the first period,
experience in real time is different. Generally, work precedes pay, which precedes spending it
(but not borrowing against it). So modeling in continuous time would naturally have a similar
role for discounting on both aspects - saving and willingness to work. But that does not rule
out the possibility that the preferences of high and low savers differ in other ways than just
'This can be considered an implication of the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem, since there is separability and
everyone has the same subutility function over first period earnings and consumption. Notice that if a savings
tax is not allowed, the two types can be usefully separated by an earnings tax. The marginal tax on the
earnings of the potentially imitated type is positive if and only if that type saves less for the same earnings.
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a discount rate on otherwise identical utility and disutility functions (assuming additivity).
There are reasons based on casual empiricism for supporting the appropriateness of using the
formulation employed above. Modeling savings with rationality and discounting combines
underlying preferences and issues of self-control. As discussed in Banks and Diamond (2008),
psychological analyses suggest these are mixed together. We see no reason to think that this
does not apply to working as well as to consuming - whether that is working for later
consumption or working to influence future work opportunities. That is, working (at a job
with disutility) involves self-control for a future payoff. And saving involves self-control. So
those with less difficulty in self-control may show greater willingness to both work and save,
which would be captured in the standard utility function expression. In a richer model,
human capital investment involves discounting in a similar way to savings decisions and so
may generate the pattern in the standard model structure, although formal modeling would
distinguish between human and financial capital accumulations.
It is not easy to find data applying directly to this issue. The question we want to
answer is whether, for a given level of skill, those with higher savings rates tend to have
greater labor supply functions. A complication in looking at data comes from the differences
in circumstances with age, which we address by considering separate age cells. We report a
few correlations supportive of a positive correlation among savings propensities, discounting
and earnings abilities using the Survey of Consumer Finances, which includes some questions
on time horizon and savings practice. 8 We also report some correlations with work effort.
Before turning to the data, we briefly consider a three-period version of the two-period model
we have been considering. This will bring out some of the complications in interpreting the
data at different ages. There is also a complication in interpreting the data across education
levels. Education choices reflect both ex ante "skill" and discount rate and then affect wage
rates, which matter for later taxation. Presumably, the level of completed education is
increasing in both ex ante skill and discount factor, on average. In addition to affecting ex
post skill, education may affect one's discount rate thereafter. Thus education is a proxy
for both skill and discount rate and can not be used in a simple way to distinguish between
them. A further difficulty in interpreting the correlations is that education is a discrete
variable while skill is continuous and varying within education classes.
7.1 Three-period Model
We set up a three-period model with the same preference structure as the two-period model
analyzed, assuming the same discounting for the utility of consumption and the disutility of
For discussion of correlations with experimentally measured discount rates, see Chabris et al, 2008.
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X2
= — = 5R
%2
~2
-- (5R)- 1/0
\
( n2
z2/n2
zi/n-i
-- (5Ry 1/0
\
( n 2
work and allowing for different skills in the two working periods.
u [xi] + 8u \x 2 ] + 5
2
u [c] - v [zi/m] - 5v [z2 /?i2 ]
Considering the special case with
u [x] = log [x] and v [z/n] = k (z/nf+1 / {(3 + 1)
,
we have the time series of consumption and earnings behavior, assuming that hours are
a control variable and the marginal tax rate is constant over time (with derivation in the
Appendix):
1+1//3
1/73
Thus, those with higher discount factors have more rapidly growing consumption but less
rapidly growing earnings (for given skills). This suggests that the cross section pattern of
earnings and work effort may be different at different ages.
The cross-section pattern of time series behavior may be more illuminating than that of
single-period behavior since the single-period cross section patterns are dependent on the full
pattern over time in skills. If we added uncertain rates of return to the model, we would also
be concerned about income effects in both consumption and earnings choices. Consideration
of wealth or wealth/earnings ratios are also affected by the time series pattern of skills. But
we do not explore these issues, just reporting simple correlations.
7.2 Data Analysis
We first consider the relations among discounting, saving, education and age. We use the
SCF panels in 1998, 2001 and 2004, containing information on 13,266 households in total.
For savings rates we consider two proxies. The first proxy is the logarithm of the ratio of net
worth to earnings for households. The second proxy is whether people report that they save
regularly or not. 9 The sample is divided into age-education cells (5-year age groupings from
''Subjects can choose among different statements. We use for this second proxy whether subjects confirm
the statement: "Save regularly by putting money aside each month." The results are similar (with sign
reversal) with the statement "Don't save - usually spend about as much as income."
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